Post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan The WritePass Journal

Post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan Afghanistan Post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan ). In the case of Afghanistan however, the US-led invasion had no clear strategies for a state-building process (Ayub and Kouvo, 2008). As a result, the initial focus on the ‘war on terror’ lacked a clear direction at it failed to provide a clear division between short-term goals of pacifying the terrorist threat and the longer-term peace-building process within the country (ibid). The invasion of Afghanistan was not about promoting security bur rather reducing the spreading sense of insecurity in the US (Nesiah, 2004).The state-building process that followed had no clear goals and was characterised by competing paradigms, as well as incompatible agendas (Weinberger, 2002; Rubin, 2006; Suhrke, 2012). It can be argued that the Taliban resurgence in 2005 and consequent lack of security in the country precluded any substantial democratization effort. However, this ignores the causal relationship between the two: failure of the political process, and an incoherent US/NATO military strategy, which provided the vacuum and space necessary for the Taliban and other counter-systemic actors to establish and expand their influence in the country (Suhrke, 2008). Linked to the incoherent military strategy is the limited impact of the DDR process that was to strengthen the position of the ISAF (Reynolds, 2006; Saikal, 2012). The expansion of ISAF outside of Kabul also played a significant part in the escalation of the conflict (Suhrke, 2011). The escalating war ratcheted up the demand for rapid and visible results, both within Afghanistan and from domestic audiences in the contributing countries. To deliver quick and visible results, the interveners adopted measures that undermined basic precepts of state-building and by extension its contribution to peacebuilding. In order to rapidly create Afghan military capacity, for example, the international forces started rearming the militias (Lefevre, 2010). A large amount of resources were diverted towards training the ANA, whereas the lack of training for the ANP produced problems for the ISAF, mainly in terms of corruption and human rights abuses (Beljan, 2013). The establishment of PRTs throughout the country was seen as the solution for providing security and reconstruction at the same time (ibid.). However, their activity was characterised by lack of clear objectives, lack of a clear commanding structure and lack of resources (Sedra, 2005). This lack of coherence is not only characteristic of the PRTs themselves, but rather to the lack of a clear strategy for the operation of ISAF (Sperling and Webber, 2012), as the establishment of security needs to run parallel to economic development as part of restructuring efforts. As it was noted, the availability of resources for peacebuilding has a significant impact on the successful resolution of a violent conflict. Yet, the large flows of unconditioned aid are said to re-create the environment in which the civil war in the 1990s erupted and evolved (Goodhand and Sedra, 2007). Afghanistan is also a challenging case for the study and application of peace conditionalities, as the Bonn Agreement itself only legitimised a ‘victor’s peace’, leaving the Taliban quite potent. Secondly, the dual nature of the process should be emphasised – building peace in a climate of ongoing war. The approach adopted by the Alliance forces, to create a security force whilst at the same time failing to provide an institution that is to be responsible for its management is yet another reflection of the prioritisation of short-term goals over peace-making and state-building in the longer term (Sedra, 2005). Although reconstruction has been a top priority and used as a political platform during the first parliamentary elections (Wilder, 2005), the international spending has emphasised security over reconstruction (Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, 2003). The long-standing conflict itself has resulted in the development of a war economy (Felbab-Brown, 2005; Fielden and Goodhand, 2001) in which it is difficult for the emerging democratic state to claim monopoly over violence. Facing considerable historical and institutional constraints, the UN Assistance mission in Afghanistan, a part of which is ISAF, has found it difficult to implement its ambitious democratisation mandate (Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl, 2008; Saikal, 2012). In conclusion, despite ISAF has achieved some successes in the training of Afghanistan’s security forces and improving security (Beljan, 2013), it is difficult to claim to the mandate and goals which were set as its main tasks have been achieved. 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